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CASES NOTED
abuses. By holding that a city may close its recreational facilities rather
than integrate them, the Court has given local governments a new "legal"
method of avoiding desegregation. Unfortunately, the majority of the
Court chose not to consider the ultimate effect of Jackson's actions to the
black community. Because of lower economic standing, it is unlikely that
Blacks would be able to afford membership fees at privately-owned pools
(assuming they are even admitted). Particularly disturbing is the fact
that this decision was rendered in favor of a city which has been known
for its resistance to the integration of any public facility. Under the
rationale of Palmer, members of minority groups may think twice before
attempting to force a local government to desegregate recreational fa-
cilities or programs since the response of the city fathers could be to
simply close the facilities and lay the blame on excessive operational costs
and danger.8 4 In such a situation, there are certainly no winners-only
losers.
MICHAEL A. ROSEN
UNANIMITY IN CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS:
ANTIQUITY OR NECESSITY?
Defendant, on trial for commission of a felony, was convicted in an
Oregon trial court by a jury verdict with only ten of the twelve jurors
concurring. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Oregon,' held, affirmed:
Defendant's constitutional rights as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment were not violated by a conviction based on a less
than unanimous jury verdict. State v. Apodaca, 1 Or. App. 483, 462 P.2d
691 (1969). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
October, 1970,2 and Apodaca, along with the companion case of Johnson
v. Louisiana,' was reargued on January 10, 1972.1
33. See, e.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1963), where
the court took "judicial notice that the State of Mississippi has a steel-hard, inflexible, un-
deviating official policy of segregation. The policy is stated in its laws. It is rooted in custom."
(citations omitted).
34. It is important to note that the only recreational facilities closed were the pools,
and these were closed only after extended litigation. See note 1 supra. City parks, golf courses
and the zoo remained open. Evidently, only at the swimming pools would disorder and
economic loss occur.
1. The Court of Appeals of Oregon en bane decided State v. Apodaca along with three
companion cases: State v. Plumes; State v. Madden; and State v. Cooper; all reported at
1 Or. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691 (1969). The unanimous jury verdict was the sole question on
appeal in all four cases.
2. Apodaca v. Oregon, cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970) [hereinafter cited in text as
Apodaca].
3. Johnson v. Louisiana, prob. juris, noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970). This case deals with
a nine-three criminal conviction for armed robbery. For the lower court opinion, see State
v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So.2d 825 (1970).
4. See 40 U.S.L.W. 3331 (January 10, 1972). [At the time of publication, the Court
affirmed the holding in Apodaca. See 40 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. filed May 22, 1972).]
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The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to
a trial by jury. The phrase, "trial by jury," has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States to mean, "a trial by jury as under-
stood and applied at common law. . . .,' Three essential elements com-
prised a jury trial at common law: (1) a twelve man jury; (2) under
the supervision and guidance of a judge; and (3) a unanimous verdict
of the jurors.'
The first element, a twelve man jury, was held inapplicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment in the case of Williams v. Flor-
ida.7 In deciding Williams, the Supreme Court looked not only to the
historical basis,8 but also to the necessity for a twelve man jury in a
criminal trial. In rendering its decision, the Court did not equate the
requirements for a jury under the fourteenth amendment with its com-
mon law characteristics.' Rather, the Court formulated its own test to
determine the necessary elements of a constitutionally valid jury trial.
The Court stated that the relevant inquiry must center on the function
and purpose that the particular element performs in a jury trial. °
In applying this test, the Supreme Court stated in Williams that
the number of men required to compose a jwry should not be based on
historical accident." The rationale for fixing a specific number of jurors
must be based on the necessity for that specific number. With regard to
the issue of necessity, the Court ruled that six men could decide issues
of fact with the same fairness and justice as twelve men. 2 However, in
Williams, the Court did not deal with the other common law character-
istics of a jury trial. One of them, the necessity for unanimity in jury
trials, is now being reviewed by the Supreme Court in Apodaca.
The requirement of unanimity in criminal jury trials, though rarely
questioned in the courts,' 3 is a right basic to the concept of trial by
5. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
6. Id.
7. 399 U.S. 78 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Williams], noted in 24 U. MIAmi L. REV.
832 (1970).
8. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1970).
9. Id. at 99.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 100.
13. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the necessity for unanimity in criminal
cases under the fourteenth amendment, although the Court has held that unanimity is a
requirement in federal criminal cases. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49
(1948); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930). Perhaps the most striking
federal case on unanimity is Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953) [herein-
after cited in text as Hibdon]. Although that case principally concerned waiver of a unani-
mous verdict rather than the requirement for unanimity, it was nevertheless one of the few
cases directly dealing with unanimity. See also Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1950). There has been, however, strong dicta indicating that unanimity is not
required in state criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). But see Springville
v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897); American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
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jury. 4 The right to a trial by jury at common law was held to be "the
most transcendent privilege" any person could enjoy.' 5 A British subject
could not be deprived of his property, liberty, or life, "but by the unan-
imous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals."' 6 The historical
foundation for this concept may provide a key in determining the neces-
sity for the unanimity rule. Unanimity was first required in England
during the early development of the present day jury system. Originally,
the jury consisted of twelve witnesses who would testify for the winning
party. Naturally, such testimony had to be unanimous.'7 "[W]hen the
twelve witnesses were translated into judges [jurors], the unanimity
rule, notwithstanding that its original significance had then departed,
remained with them."'
As early as 1367, unanimity was required under English case law. 19
This standard has remained a part of the common law, even though the
particular reasons for its initial development have abated. Although the
historical basis for the rule is antiquated, the contemporary necessity
for the rule may serve as a justification for its continued application.
In examining the necessity of the unanimity rule from a historical view-
point, Joseph Story has stated that "[t]he great object of a trial by jury
in criminal cases is, to guard against ... a spirit of violence and vindic-
tiveness on the part of the people."2 For this reason, to convict one of
a criminal charge, the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The presumption of innocence demands proof to that
extent. As this presumption applies to the unanimity rule, all of the jurors
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
if only one of them [the jurors] fixedly has a reasonable doubt,
the verdict cannot be returned .... [This means] that the pros-
ecutor in a criminal case must actually overcome the presump-
tion of innocence, all reasonable doubt as to guilt, and the
unanimous verdict requirement. 2 '
It has been suggested that a criminal conviction based on a jury
verdict which is less than unanimous would destroy the burden of proof
placed upon the prosecution.2 2 Under this theory, the failure of a juror
14. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953).
15. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
16. Id.
17. P. DEvLiN, TRIAL BY JuRY 48 (1956).
18. Id.
19. J. THAYR, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EvmENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 88-89
(1896). Thayer discussed an early unnamed English case dealing with a criminal conviction
based on a jury verdict of eleven concurring jurors. The twelfth juror who persistently
dissented from the guilty verdict was imprisoned by the judge for failure to concur with the
verdict of the other eleven. The defendant was convicted, and he appealed. On appeal, the
conviction was reversed, and the case retried for lack of unanimity.
20. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES *§ 1780. See also 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *1-9; Max-
well v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
21. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953).
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
to concur means that he has retained a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused.
Oregon, as evidenced by its decision in State v. Apodaca, does not
follow this line of reasoning. In Apodaca, the court of appeals, in a per
curiam decision, dismissed the defendant's constitutional arguments on
the authority of State v. Gann,a a case where the same defense argu-
ments used by Apodaca were raised.
In deciding Gann, the Supreme Court of Oregon had based its deci-
sion on a provision of the Oregon constitution 4 which permits a ten-two
jury verdict for non-capital crimes. The supreme court upheld the con-
stitutional provision for three reasons:
Because of the absence of any decision of the United States
Supreme Court directly to the contrary, because the people of
Oregon were acting within their power to regulate the incidents
of criminal procedure . . . and because a unanimous verdict
is not a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial," we hold
that the Oregon Constitution is not a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 5
The court then concluded that unanimity is not an essential element of
a fair trial, citing many authorities which dispel the historical basis for
the unanimity rule.26 In addition, the court summarily dismissed the
"reasonable doubt" argument raised by the defense in Gann.
[A] failure of one or two jurors to agree with the verdict of
their fellow jurors is more likely to be caused by a failure of the
dissenters to correctly understand the evidence or the court's
instructions or by some extraneous cause having no relation
to the quantum of proof.27
The Gann court favorably cited statements by Sir Patrick Devlin
to support its decision on the antiquity of the unanimity rule.28 How-
ever, the court failed to consider what Devlin had stated relative to the
extraneous influences of a dissenting juror. Devlin believed that a dis-
senting juror was not a "crank," and that the rare appearance of an
eccentric juror did not occur often enough to demand reform of accepted
methods requiring unanimity among the jurors.29 Although a juror's
23. 254 Or. 549, 463 P.2d 570 (1969) [hereinafter cited in text as Gann]. Johnson v.
Louisiana (See note 3 supra) was decided in the same manner, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court cited State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So.2d 273 (1968).
24. OR. CONST. art. I, § 11, which states:
[I]n the Circuit Court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or
not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of the first degree murder, which
shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise . ...
25. State v. Gann, 254 Or. 549, 565, 463 P.2d 570, 577 (1969). See also State v. Schoon-
over, 252 La. 311, 323-24, 211 So.2d 273, 278 (1968).
26. State v. Gann, 254 Or. 549, 562, 463 P.2d 570, 576 (1969).
27. Id. at 561, 463 P.2d at 575.
28. Id. at 556, 463 P.2d at 573.
29. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 57 (1956).
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dissent may result from a misunderstanding or from outside influences,
Devlin believed that as a general rule dissent arises from a juror's belief
that there is "[a] real possibility of the defence being right.) 30
If the nonconcurrence of a juror arises from misunderstanding the
evidence or jury instructions, then the solution is not to disregard that
dissent, but rather to properly instruct the jury on the applicable law.
The onus is upon the judge to make his instructions to the jury completely
free from question or doubt. If a judge's failure to properly instruct
results in a dissent, that dissent should not then be disregarded on the
theory that the dissent does not go to the question of guilt or innocence.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Apodaca is whether the rea-
sonable doubt which must be overcome by the prosecution is that of all
the jurors collectively or that of each individual juror. Hibdon v. United
States,"' one of the rare cases dealing with unanimous jury verdicts,
examined this question and considered the jury as one unit. Judge Simons,
writing for the court, dealt with the jury as a "group mind" and con-
tended that less than unanimous verdicts by the jury's "group mind"
would offend the constitution. He reasoned that since proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required by law, there is an implied demand that
the jury must decide guilt or innocence by objective standards. How-
ever, while he recognized that the nature of man presupposes that each
individual will make this decision according to his own subjective stan-
dards, Judge Simons reasoned that each juror's subjective verdict would
react upon the subjective verdicts of his brother jurors, each cancelling
out the emotional and subjective reasoning of the other, resulting in a
verdict void of subjective reasoning. Thus, the court in Hibdon, equated
the individual subjective verdicts of the jurors with an objective verdict
coming from the "group mind" of the jury.
Judge Simons' view would ensure a verdict based on proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, a single dissenting juror indicating reasonable doubt
in the mind of the entire jury. However, our criminal jury system does
not operate in accord with this view. The dissent of one juror results in
a hung jury requiring a retrial, rather than a verdict of not guilty. Thus,
it has been said of Hibdon that "[p] roof beyond a reasonable doubt
should be confined to the subjective standard applied by the individual
juror, and unanimity-a group concept-must be justified in some other
terms." 2
If unanimity is to be the accepted rule for jury verdicts, the pros-
ecutor must make a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to each
individual juror. If the jury as a whole must be convinced beyond a
30. Id.
31. 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY, § 1.3(b) (approved draft 1968); P. DEvL N, TRIAL
BY JURY 48-49 (1956).
32. Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity-Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21
U. CHI. L. REv. 438, 442 (1954).
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reasonable doubt, and if Judge Simons' view of the jury's "group mind"
is disregarded, less than unanimous verdicts may not offend the sixth
and fourteenth amendments of the constitution, and the abolition of the
unanimity rule may not destroy the concept of reasonable doubt, since
the prosecutor can be said to have a burden of proof and a burden of
persuasion. Like the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion can be
divided into two elements:
the necessity for convincing the individual juror beyond a
reasonable doubt and the need for convincing all twelve of them.
If the second element is removed ... it can be said, in a very
real sense, that the prosecutor's burden of persuasion is lessened.
But is does not destroy the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt if that concept is limited to the necessity for
convincing an individual juror by a certain degree.8"
This proposition is true, however, only if Judge Simons' concept of the
"group mind" of the jury is disregarded.
In looking to the future decision of the Supreme Court in Apodaca,
there may be doubt as to whether the Court is ready to rule on the neces-
sity of unanimity. In Williams v. Florida,84 the necessity of the unanimity
rule was discussed, but the Court expressly stated that it would not
"intimate . . . whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an in-
dispensible element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial."3" But, in its
last term, without explanation, the Court requested the parties to re-
argue the case in the upcoming term, and that the Department of justice
enter the arguments.8" Consequently, it appears likely that the Supreme
Court will soon decide the issue of unanimous verdicts in criminal jury
trials.
In the opinion of this writer, the Supreme Court's decision in Wil-
liams v. Florida has weakened the jury system. Whether this indicates
a trend paralleling the philosophy of the Nixon Administration, which
favors states' rights, remains to be seen." A decision by the newly con-
33. Id. at 443. But see ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
TRIAL BY JUaY, § 1.3(b) (approved draft 1968).
34. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
35. Id. at 100 n.46.
36. Interview with Mrs. Louise S. Korns, Attorney for Respondent, in Johnson v.
Louisiana, 255 La. 314, 230 So.2d 825 (1970); prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970) at
New Orleans, August 21, 1971. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 91 S. Ct. 2289 (1971) (set for
reargument).
37. These views were expressed by then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehn-
quist, speaking for the Justice Department, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (a
proposed speedy trial bill). Mr. Rehnquist indicated that the Justice Department, in order
to lend its support to the proposed bill, should include (as further measures to insure speedy
trials) the modification of the exclusionary rule, limitations on the use of Habeas Corpus,
severe sanctions on attorneys that delay trials, and the elimination of unanimous jury
verdicts. 117 Cong. Rec. 12,393 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1971) (public remarks of William H.
Rehnquist).
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stituted Court" approving the positions of Oregon and Louisiana would
not be totally unexpected. The essence of our criminal justice system
hinges on a verdict of guilty by the entire jury based on proof beyond
any reasonable doubt. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of Apodaca,
this writer maintains that in criminal trials, the prosecution must not
only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury as a whole, but
must make that showing to each individual juror. If any juror does not
believe that the defendant is guilty, a verdict of guilty cannot be rendered,
and rather than convict a defendant when such doubt exists, a retrial
should be ordered. Any other standard would lessen the responsibility
placed on the prosecution for a conviction by the burden of proof re-
quired, and the presumption of innocence would be fatally weakened.
It is therefore submitted that the unanimity rule for criminal jury verdicts
is not merely an historical antique, but is a necessity for a fair trial.
RAYMOND M. SEIDLER
WILL CONTESTS: THE SHIFTING BURDENS OF PROOF
Petitioners were lineal descendants, who had not been included in
their mother's will. They contested probate of the will on the grounds
that the testamentary instrument had been obtained as a result of the
exercise of undue influence by their sister, the sole beneficiary. The
county judge found that a "confidential relationship" existed between
mother and daughter and that the daughter actively procured the will.
Consequently, the judge ruled that a presumption of undue influence
arose and that the burden of proof shifted to the daughter, requiring her
to prove that there was no undue influence. The court then found that
the daughter's evidentiary showing was insufficient to carry the burden of
proof necessary to rebut the presumption and refused to admit the will
to probate. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the
county judge and held that the raising of a presumption of undue influ-
ence did not shift the burden of proof to the proponent of the will. Ac-
cording to the Fourth District, the daughter was only required to intro-
duce "credible evidence" to rebut the presumption; once such evidence
was introduced, the presumption and the persuasiveness of its support-
ing evidence disappeared. Having determined that the presumption failed
and after reviewing the other remaining evidence in the record, the court
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of undue
influence as a matter of law.1 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida
38. At the time of the writing of this Note, Mr. Justice Harlan and the late Mr.
Justice Black announced their resignations to the Supreme Court, and since that time
President Nixon has appointed two new Justices to the Court including William Rehnquist.
1. In re Carpenter, 239 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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